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Abstract: This article critically engages with Laclauian theory of populism 
by utilizing Michael Oakeshott’s theory of politics. It argues that both build 
their works on similar post-foundationalist premises, accepting once the 
impossibility of a final ground of society as well as the possibility of its 
contingent political foundations. It then shows that both scholars 
conceptualise politics residing on a continuum between what they consider as 
two theoretical extremes: politics of faith and scepticism for Oakeshott, pure 
populism and pure institutionalism for Laclau. In terms of the ways in which 
they operate, functions they fulfil, and effects they have on politics, these 
extremes overlap with one another to such an extent that they can be 
considered as near synonyms. This synonymy serves as a fertile ground to 
spread the seeds of a reconsideration of Laclau’s account of populism. 
Utilizing Fieschi and Heywood’s concept of entrepreneurial populism, the 
article briefly problematizes his account and calls attention to this particular 
species of populism gaining increasing popularity in contemporary politics. 
It is every bit of populist in its modus operandi yet neither subverts the status 
quo nor aims to reconstruct a new one, but simply plays it. 
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At first sight, it seems like there could be no more contrasting intellectual stances than of 
Michael Oakeshott and Ernesto Laclau. While Oakeshott is hailed as a ‘brilliant disciple of 
Burke’ (Kirk 1952, 416), ‘right-wing guru’ who articulated best ‘the real philosophical 
foundations of Mrs Thatcher’s policies’ (Riley 1992), and despised by leftist intellectuals as a 
‘crypto-fascist’ (Anderson 1992) for evincing ‘consistent hostility to most of the central 
features of modern social democratic politics’ (Horton 2005, 24),
1
 Laclau is counted among 
the few contemporary intellectual pioneers of post-Marxist tradition offering a renewed 
ontology for the emancipatory projects of the left after the end of Cold War (Torfing 1999; 
Critchley and Marchart 2004; Marchart 2007). Thus unsurprisingly, in what seems to be the 
only work engaging in a direct, if rather brief, comparison of the two, Stuart Isaacs concludes 
that, despite a few parallels at certain levels, there lays ‘an ocean between’ their thoughts 
(2006, 193). 
                                               
1 For other, more scholarly critics of his “conservatism”, see Farr 1998; Devigne 1994; Abel 2010. This view, 
however, has long been called into question by many commentators, so much so that he has been considered even 
as a ‘theorist of contingency and pluralism’ (Gerencser 2000, 2). See also Rayner 1985; Rorty 1989; Mouffe 1992; 
and Soininen 2005. This alternative view of Oakeshott is touched upon more in detail below. 
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Contrary to Isaacs, the initial argument of this article is that, in fact, both Laclau and 
Oakeshott build their works on similar post-foundationalist premises, accepting once the 
impossibility of a final ground of society as well as the possibility of its contingent political 
foundations (Marchant 2007). Although this is more apparent and, thus, gained more 
intellectual approval in Laclau’s case, even the most unorthodox readers of Oakeshott 
consider him at best as an anti- and not post-foundationalist thinker (cf. Rayner 1985; Rorty 
1989; Soininen 2005).
2
 Building upon this fundamental parallel between the two, this article 
also shows that both scholars conceptualise political practices residing on a continuum 
between what they consider as two theoretical extremes: politics of faith vs. politics of 
scepticism (Oakeshott 1996) and pure populism vs. pure institutionalism (Laclau 2005a, 
2005b). Though neither can exist in purity, or alone, what makes politics not only possible but 
also contingent for both scholars is simultaneous presence of both extremes at varying degrees 
and tension between them. It is the intention of this paper to show that in terms of the ways in 
which they operate, functions they fulfil, and effects they have on politics, these extremes 
overlap with one another to such an extent that they can be considered as near synonyms: 
politics of faith with pure populism, politics of scepticism with pure institutionalism. 
And finally, this synonymy serves as a fertile ground to spread the seeds of a 
reconsideration of Laclau’s account of populism as consisting in the subversion of status quo 
and radical reconstruction of a new order (2005a, 122-123, 177-178; 2005b, 47-48). Utilizing 
Fieschi and Heywood’s concept of ‘entrepreneurial populism’, this paper briefly 
problematizes his account in such a way that it calls attention to this particular species of 
populism gaining increasing popularity in contemporary politics (2004). It is every bit of 
populist in its modus operandi yet neither subverts the status quo nor aims to reconstruct a 
new one, but simply plays it. 
 
1. Concordia Discors: Faithful Populism vs. Sceptical Institutionalism 
Notwithstanding the obvious differences between Laclau and Oakeshott in terms of where 
their hearths lie on the political spectrum, the commonalities between their takes on “society” 
are striking and, to the knowledge of this author, have gone mostly unnoticed.
3
 There is a 
fruitful comparison to be made here, for this serves as an opening point to see the parallels 
between their corresponding reflections on the politics as residing on a continuum between 
two extremes. 
 
1.1 Contingency, Impossibility, and Necessity 
One comes across with Laclau’s post-foundational take on society frequently in the form 
of a single, provocative statement: ‘society does not exist’. It is his critique of the Marxist 
structuralism which lays out the path leading to this conclusion most clearly and provides a 
formulation of ‘Laclauian enterprise in nuce’ (Marchart 2007, 136).
4
 Envisioning society as a 
structural totality formed by an economic base and an ideological superstructure, structuralist 
model, Laclau asserts, assigns an ‘essential’ status to society with a positivity of its own, 
whose modus operandi can be ‘recognized’ behind the superficial empirical variations of 
social life, if only with the help of a particular set of analytical tools. Considered as such, 
                                               
2 Though Marchant, in his very brief account of Oakeshott, claims that he cannot be categorized as an anti-
foundationalist thinker and even hints towards the possibility of considering him as a post-foundationalist, he does 
not offer any discussion to examine this inclination (2007, 3-15). 
3 With the exceptions of Isaacs (2006) and Marchart (2007), both of which are discussed in more detail below. 
4 To be sure, Laclau does not consider Marxist structuralist model as the only one attaining a closed social totality 
as a possibility. By claiming that ‘society is an impossible object of analysis, he [Laclau] seeks to exclude 
essentialist, objectivist, and topographical conceptions of social relations (whether put forward by positivists, 
materialists, or realists)’ (Howarth 2000, 113). 
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society operates as a ‘founding totality’ upon which knowledge of all its partial processes can 
be grounded (Laclau 1990, 90). Laclauian objection to the society-as-totality is based on a 
linguistically informed argument for, what he calls, the ‘infinitude of the social’, which is the 
idea that ‘any system of meaning is contingent, contextual, and relational’, and is always 
surrounded by an ineradicable ‘excess of meaning’ that it is unable to master (Laclau 1990, 
90; Howarth 2004, 266). Hence, for Laclau, “society” as an intelligible and unified whole 
providing exhaustive patterns of relationality between all social meanings does not and cannot 
exist. 
Oakeshott too approaches the term society with extreme caution. And like Laclau, details 
of his take on it are fleshed out in the course of a more general critique, a critique of human 
sciences and education. In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott proposes his ‘own version of the 
hermeneutic criterion’ to define human sciences as exclusively concerned with investigation 
of meanings that are attributed to intelligent human conducts, and making ‘interpretive 
inquiries concerned with the meanings, intentions, and contexts that make an individual 
practice or performance what it is’ (Oakeshott 1975, 23-24; Nardin 2001, 128-129). 
Oakeshott’s use of human rather than social sciences stems from his conviction that the latter 
conceives of society as a ‘totality of human relationships’, a ‘system to be understood in terms 
of its regularities or its causal conditions’ (1975, 24). Although he considers this society-as-
totality being prevalent in most approaches to “social” sciences, Oakeshott, like Laclau, finds 
its clearest expression in structuralism: 
 
[T]his “system” is said to have a “structure” which contains and 
displays functional relationships between its parts and properties. 
And change in this structure (so called “social change”) is 
understood to be a process analogous to the metabolic or 
evolutionary change of biological organisms. […] In the more 
sophisticated versions, the explanatory “laws” are the alleged 
psychological or bio-evolutionary “laws” or causal conditions said 
to be postulated in the correlations of characteristics (Oakeshott 
1975, 24-25). 
 
Oakeshott bases his objection to a structured society on similar grounds with Laclau. The 
problem with this model, for him, is that it mistakes the ‘contingent relationships’ emerging 
from intelligent human conduct as ‘causal or systematic connections’ among ‘components of 
an unspecified, unconditional interdependence’, and consequently lumps them under the 
misnomer of ‘something called a “society” or “Society”’ (Oakeshott 1989, 34-35). For 
Oakeshott, as Nardin observes, ‘there is no such thing as a social relationship that is not a 
relationship of a specific kind’ (Nardin 2001, 125). ‘Human conduct is continuously and 
decisively “social” only in respect of agents being associated in terms of their understanding 
and enjoyment of specific practices’ (Oakeshott 1975, 87). 
Many students of Oakeshott agree that the significance he assigns to the contingency of the 
social relationship brings him closer to anti-foundationalism (cf. Rorty 1989; Soininen 2005; 
Isaacs 2006). Nonetheless, as Oliver Marchart points out, what specifically makes Laclauian 
enterprise post- rather than anti-foundationalist is its verdict that the ultimate impossibility of 
the social to suture itself into a closed totality is a ‘productive one’ (2007, 136). The residual 
‘excess of meaning’ that is bound to remain out of any “social” not only makes it impossible 
to reach an ultimate fixation of meaning, it also paves the way for an ‘infinite play of 
differences’ which Laclau calls the discursive. Understood as such, the “social” is an attempt 
to create, however temporarily, a finite order, a hegemonic discourse within this infinitude, 
striving to ‘proceed to a relative fixation of the social through the institution of nodal points’ 
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(Laclau 1990, 90-91). As the privileged condensations of meaning, these points partially fix 
the identities of chains of signifiers and, consequently, make it possible to form a temporarily 
stable discourse around themselves. Reaching such relative fixations is not only possible but 
necessary, for we need a stable system of meaning so that we can avoid getting lost in a 
‘psychotic’ discourse where there is no fixed meaning at all (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112-
113; Laclau 2005a, 70-71). 
Oakeshott too employs the term nodal points and does so in quite the similar manner 
during the course of his discussion on morality, invoking an analogy between language and 
morality which is also extended into politics later on. I think it is precisely here one finds how 
close his ontology gets to post- rather than anti-foundationalism and, consequently, to 
Laclau’s. In every occasion of human conduct, Oakeshott asserts, there is a ‘vernacular 
language’ of self-enactment, enabling its users not only to understand one another, but also to 
modify this language continuously and trespass its established limits so that they can ‘explore 
relationships far more varied and interesting than those it has a name for’ or its established 
patterns would ‘allow’ (1975, 63). Because it is a historical construct under constant change 
depending on the ways in which its users, who are also in constant permutation, deem 
necessary or plausible to employ, one cannot expect to find stability even in its main features. 
‘Its abstract nouns (right and wrong, proper and improper, obligation, dueness, fairness, 
respect, justice, etc.), when they appear, are faded metaphors, and it is only the uneducated 
who insist that each must have a single unequivocal meaning indifferent to context’ 
(Oakeshott 1975, 63). Politics is no different than morality in this respect, for it too functions 
on an infinite field of discursivity where reaching a final ground is impossible: 
 
“Fascism” is not less multiple than “democracy” or than 
“government” itself. We do not possess a “scientific” political 
language in which each expression has a fixed, simple and 
universally recognized meaning; we have only a living, popular 
language, at the mercy of use and circumstance in which each 
expression is susceptible of many interpretations, none of which is 
without force or significance (Oakeshott 1996, 9, 21). 
 
Because of this, Oakeshott insists, no such language ‘can ever be perfectly responsive to 
the demands made upon it’. It is ‘never fixed or finished’ and, thus, can be recognised as 
nothing but ‘its vicissitudes’ (1975, 64). Or, to phrase it in Laclauian terms, it cannot suture 
itself into a closed totality because of a perpetual excess of meaning. Nevertheless, for him, 
just as for Laclau, this impossibility does not change the fact that it is still necessary to reach a 
relative fixation of meaning. For its speakers to have an idea of ‘what, on earth, they have 
come to understand themselves to be’ and avoid getting lost in a psychotic universe, as Laclau 
would have put, it needs a ‘settled character’ in terms of which it ‘articulates relationships, 
responsibilities, duties, etc., recognizable’ by its speakers (Oakeshott 1975, 64).  
Oakeshott argues that this is achieved through the ‘rules of conduct’ that help to keep a 
language in shape by providing a ‘basic vocabulary and some elementary constructions’ 
familiar to all. He suggests imagining those rules (which also include duties, principles, 
dogmas and like) as ‘nodal points’ where practices are articulated in such a way that they turn 
upon themselves ‘in a vertiginous movement’, lose their ‘characteristic expansiveness’ and 
eventually ‘become steadier in ceasing to be adventurous’ (1975, 66-68). In other words, these 
rules qua ‘nodal points’ help instituting a settled language, however temporarily, through a 
privileging of certain meanings of practices while excluding others. Although the potential for 
different meanings is as present as always, a successful “settling” of language creates a terrain 
where the trails of that potential do not prove immediately visible because ‘certain concepts 
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become exaggerated and mistaken for the whole of the language themselves’ (Isaacs 2006, 
170-171).  
This, of course, largely corresponds to what Laclau, following Husserl, calls the process of 
‘sedimentation’ which consists in forgetting the contingent origins of ‘sedimented practices’ 
that make up the field of “the social” and mistaking them as mere objective presences (Laclau 
1990, 34-35). The “political”, on the other hand, ‘requires a reactivation of the contingent 
moment of foundation’ of those practices, ‘thus disclosing the potential for different 
constructions’ (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 116). But according to Laclau, this reactivation 
cannot be ‘unmediated’, that is, it is impossible achieve a totally political institution of the 
social. For the social relations to exist there needs to be at least a minimal distance between 
the political and the social where some routinized practices are already present: ‘any political 
construction takes place against the background of a range of sedimented practices’ (Laclau 
1990, 35). Following Laclau, Marchant argues that ‘traditions are nothing but such routinized 
practices’ which, one may add, the political reactivation process has to take as its background 
(Marchant 2007, 139). And as Chantal Mouffe notes, Oakeshott is fully aware of this central 
role traditions play for the political processes which, for him, have no other ground but those 
already existing traditions to rely on as its starting point (1993, 16-17). Politics consists in the 
modification of those routinized practices by digging down to their origins to find not only 
their reason d’être, but also what those practices conceal, i.e. those options excluded in their 
original institution:  
 
Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a 
collection of people who, in respect of their common recognition of 
a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single 
community. […] This activity, then, springs neither from instant 
desires, nor from general principles, but from the existing traditions 
of behaviour themselves. And the form it takes, because it can take 
no other, is the amendment of existing arrangements by exploring 
and pursuing what is intimated in them. The arrangements which 
constitute a society capable of political activity, whether these are 
customs or institutions or laws or diplomatic decisions, are at once 
coherent and incoherent; they compose a pattern and at the same 
time they intimate a sympathy for what does not fully appear. 
Political activity is the exploration of that sympathy; and 
consequently, relevant political reasoning will be convincing 
exposure of a sympathy, present but not yet followed up, and the 
convincing demonstration that now is the appropriate moment for 
recognizing it (Oakeshott 1991, 56-57, emphasis added). 
 
1.2 Swinging on a Continuum 
For Oakeshott, then, politics, like any human conduct, has the form of a vernacular 
language functioning on the infinite field of discursivity where no meaning is ultimately fixed. 
This ‘ambiguity of our political vocabulary’, as he calls it in his posthumously published The 
Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, is not something one should be regretful of but 
embrace, since it provides a set of peaceful tools for clash of differences that would otherwise 
take a violent form, ‘like a veil which softens the edges and moderates the differences for 
what it at once hides and reveals’ (Oakeshott 1996, 21).
5
 He claims that this ambiguity is 
                                               
5 Although this work could not be dated exactly, it appears to have been written in the early 1950s. Its editor, 
Timothy Fuller, thinks that it is completed probably in 1952 (Oakeshott 1996, ix). 
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reflected in political activity as well as our understanding of this activity in such a way that 
throughout the modernity politics has been fluctuating on a continuum between two poles: 
‘the politics of faith’ and ‘the politics of scepticism’. 
It is possible to consider these poles (which Oakeshott originally calls ‘styles’) as 
discourses in Laclauian terminology insofar as, like Benjamin Arditi notes, the two are in a 
continuous struggle for domination over the terms of our political vocabulary, exerting their 
articulatory influences over the ways in which politics at any given moment is arranged and it 
is this struggle that accounts for the ultimate contingency of these arrangements (Arditi 2007, 
45; Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105-110). Oakeshott claims that the two constitute the horizons 
of politics as its ideal extremes, providing once ‘the limits and the impetus’ of political 
movement. Rather than being possible edges which politics may occasionally reach but cannot 
pass, he conceives them as the opposite ‘charges’ of a single activity, politics, affecting the 
whole range of its movement by exerting their ‘pull’ simultaneously but in opposite 
directions. Any particular form of modern politics has been the resultant of a discordant 
harmony of both and not merely the consequence of one. Although Oakeshott pinpoints a few 
notable occasions when ‘one or other has swung particularly close to its theoretic extreme’,
6
 
he maintains that neither of these ‘logical opposites’ can exist in purity but in varying degrees 
of mixture, for each has an inherent tendency to turn into its own ‘nemesis’ and ‘abolish 
politics’ if unchecked by the other (Oakeshott 1996, 21-22, 30, 91-94). 
Quite a similar depiction of politics can be observed in Laclau as well, who conceptualizes 
it as ‘operating at the diverse points of a continuum’ between two theoretical extremes: 
‘institutionalist’ and ‘populist’ discourses (Laclau 2005b, 45). He argues that, as ‘reductio ad 
absurdum’ points of logical impossibilities, these discourses constitute the unreachable poles 
of politics, whose concurrent presence and tension are nonetheless prerequisites of the very 
existence of politics and its movement on that continuum (2005b, 46). Their ‘[t]ension and 
reflection can be contingently combined in unstable equilibria, but neither is entirely able to 
eliminate the other’ (Laclau 2005a, 120). At one impossible end there is pure populism, which 
is a discourse dominated only by a ‘logic of equivalence’, requiring complete collapse of all 
social differences into a singular identity and consequently leaving no space for their 
differential particularities (2005a, 82). Laclau employs the Freudian notion of a group whose 
only libidinal tie is love for the purely narcissistic leader as an example of this impossibly 
pure presence of logic of equivalence, where the group members, placing the leader into the 
place of their ego ideal, reach a point of complete ‘identification’ with one another that results 
in a total consumption of their particular egos (2005a, 52-60). On a macro-political level, this 
means that pure populism conceives the society as a homogeneous whole whose coherence 
would be exclusively assured by the presence of a frontier dividing it into two camps, like in 
the utopian discourse of various millenarian movements. The world here, Laclau maintains, is 
so infinitely separated between a movement and its negative reverse ‘incarnating evil’ that 
there exists no difference within those camps. Each and every element constituting them 
becomes identical with one another, bearing no particularity of their own (2005b, 46; Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985, 129-130).
7
 
This largely corresponds to Oakeshott’s politics of faith, or faithful discourse, where he 
even invokes the same example of millenarians as a ‘special class’ in its ranks (Oakeshott 
                                               
6 17th century English Presbyterian party, as well as socialist and communist movements of late 19th and early 20th 
century are prime examples for Oakeshott where political activity is pulled closest to its “faithful” extreme, albeit 
not being entirely free of scepticism (1996, 59-61, 66). 
7 Of course, since it functions as a limit concept, a logical impossibility for Laclau, this imaginary situation where a 
purely populist discourse operates could never be attained. In fact, he presents a deeper examination of the same 
example of millenarian revolt in On Populist Reason to show, if put in practice, how it actually would play out and 
concludes that at least a minimal contamination by the other pole is inevitable (2005a, 120-121). 
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1996, 25). Politics here is understood in a ‘Pelagian’ way as a matter of ‘achieving salvation 
in this world’ through human effort, capable of bringing about some sort of ‘perfection’ if 
granted total control and power aimed at one direction (1996, 23-24). For Oakeshott, the key 
component of perfection here is its being ‘directed to a single, exclusive goal’, and not 
‘whether it is believed that this will take a long time, may never be finally achieved or is to 
some degree indeterminate’ (Horton 2005, 25-26; Oakeshott, 1996, 26). Dominated by what 
he calls the ‘logic of perfection’, a purely faithful discourse defines all social actors and every 
manner of their activity from the perspective of one goal. Just like pure populism for Laclau, it 
‘abolishes politics’ by transforming the identity of those actors and activities in such a way 
that they are amassed under two homogeneous yet infinitely separated camps where they 
completely lose their ‘distinct and independent’ characters and become ‘indistinct components 
of a single pattern’: ones that are ‘eo ipso agents’ of that goal and other ‘illegitimate’ ones 
(Oakeshott 1996, 93-94). 
At the opposite end of Laclauian political continuum resides an equally impossible 
discourse of pure institutionalism, which is exclusively dominated by a ‘logic of difference’ 
that emphasizes only the disparities between particularities and therefore eliminates any 
ground for their partial identification with each other (Laclau 2005a, 62-63; 2005b, 45). A 
“politics” dominated only by the institutionalist discourse would reduce it to the level of 
‘administration’. Laclau argues time and again that it would liken those in the ‘myths of the 
totally reconciled society’, such as Hobbes’s Leviathan, where the particular elements 
constituting a society are absorbed into the system in a completely individual manner and 
transformed into ‘objective differences’ with absolutely nothing in common but their 
existence under one ‘singularity’. As the ‘positive nature of all its terms’ is established within 
an infinitely static structure, which Laclau calls ‘pure spatiality’, there would be absolutely no 
ground for ‘dislocation’, hence for politics (2005a, 62-63, 100; 1990, 69-72; Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 130). 
This second impossible extreme, in turn, corresponds to the politics of scepticism, or 
sceptical discourse, in Oakeshott who, as an admirer of Hobbes, once again employs the same 
example as Laclau while fleshing out how such a discourse would play out if it could operate 
alone (Oakeshott 1996, 75-76). In fact, Oakeshott sees this particular discourse so close to the 
one operating in the ‘mythical’ universe of Leviathan that he describes it almost in the same 
terms he used earlier in a review of the book: establishing a ‘superficial peace and orderliness’ 
in a world where ‘there is no place for perfection’ (2000, 162).
8
 Sceptical discourse, for him, 
attaches politics no overriding goal like the ‘pursuit of perfection’ but to keep peace and 
maintain a ‘superficial order’ so that its subjects, who share with one another nothing more 
than living under one order, can freely attend their individual matters. It ascribes utmost 
importance to the rule of law as the only way of maintaining order and, accordingly, 
understands politics as a ‘judicial’ activity responsible exclusively with ‘exact’ 
implementation of that rule (Oakeshott 1996, 32-33; Corey 2006, 165). This means that such a 
discourse, in its pure form, reduces politics to – what Oakeshott calls – a repetitive ‘play’, to 
an activity that is pursued for its own sake, ‘just to keep things going’. Similar to pure 
institutionalism for Laclau, it presupposes a completely ‘static society’ and gives into the 
‘political quietism’, a situation where ‘there can be no emergency’ requiring even the slightest 
change within the established order (Oakeshott 1996, 27, 107-108, 110-113). 
For both Laclau and Oakeshott, then, politics is conceived as residing on a continuum 
between these two opposite poles of logical impossibilities: a purely faithful or populist 
discourse dividing society into two antagonistic camps where the identities of all elements are 
                                               
8 The piece referred here is Leviathan: A Myth, which had been originally delivered by Oakeshott as a radio talk in 
1947 (Oakeshott 2000, x). 
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collapsed into one that is exclusively determined by the nature of the dividing line; and a 
purely sceptical or institutionalist one maintaining a completely stable order where all its 
elements have eternally fixed and completely differential identities. Neither can exist in 
purity, for they are ‘self-destructive’ when left alone and bring the ‘end of politics’. It is rather 
that political arrangements always contain both of them and the exact point politics is set on 
its continuum at any given moment depends on the rate at which these two impossible 
discourses blend. However, consistent to their shared post-foundationalism, both Laclau and 
Oakeshott reject the possibility of ever arriving at some sort of stable point of equilibrium and 
instead favour the idea of a constantly shifting balance, which is at once the source of ultimate 
contingency as well as of relative stability of every political arrangement (Oakeshott 1996, 
121-123; Laclau 2005a, 120, 200; Laclau 2005b, 46). 
The reason why such a comparison of Laclau and Oakeshott has been undertaken up to this 
point is not only to attract attention to the remarkable extent of similarities between their 
ideas. Although it is clearly a very significant point – one that has received regrettably little 
attention especially for Oakeshott’s account as a post-foundationalist thinker – it is not the 
whole thing. Bringing together the impossible poles of politics as they are theorized in their 
corresponding frameworks may also be useful in discerning a certain problematic in Laclauian 
concept of populism. 
 
2. Entrepreneurial Populism: A Case for Sceptical Populism? 
Within the bidimensional depiction of politics presented above, it is possible to see the 
reason behind Laclau’s controversial claim that equalizes populism with politics: the 
ineradicable presence of populism in politics stems from the impossibility of reaching the 
reductio ad absurdum point where the populist discourse is entirely absent, i.e. a pure 
institutionalism. There is always an excess of meaning that destabilizes its ‘coincidence with 
the limits of community’. This is why, Laclau insists, ‘there is no political intervention which 
is not populistic to some extent’ and, thus, the question is not if, but ‘to what degree’ 
populism is present in a given discourse (2005a, 81, 154; 2005b, 45). 
But this is not all what populism is about for Laclau. He also assigns it an inherent quality 
of subverting the status quo with the purpose of radically reconstructing a new one. And this 
movement from a mere subversion to radical reconstruction is also ‘a matter of degree’ for 
Laclau (2005a, 122-123, 177-178). It seems like an implicit assumption is at work here: the 
more “radical” a discourse is vis-à-vis the status quo, the more populist it will be. This 
suspicion gains considerable credibility when Laclau tells us that ‘the degree of populism’ of a 
movement or ideology depends on its distance from other political alternatives present in a 
community. In order to be considered as populist ‘in a particularly clear way’, he concludes, it 
needs to propose ‘a radical alternative, a choice at the crossroads on which the future of a 
given society hinges’ (2005b, 47).
9
 
If this is the case, then it appears like Laclau presupposes that for a discourse (movement, 
ideology etc.) to be perceived as unequivocally populist, it must embrace a certain 
understanding of politics which takes it not only as a matter of utmost importance (‘society’s 
future hinges on it’!), but also as a proper tool capable of bringing about some sort of 
substantial changes. This, as discussed above apropos Oakeshott, is identical to claim that for 
a given discourse to be considered unequivocally populist, it must be resultant of a 
combination where politics of faith more or less predominates over that of scepticism.
10
 
                                               
9 Laclau also includes those discourses which defend the status quo ‘against potential alternatives’ within his 
general picture of politics, but not necessarily in populism (2005b, 47-48). 
10 Incidentally, this is exactly what Margaret Canovan has suggested when she introduced Oakeshott’s model to the 
discussion on populism for the first time. Populism, for her, is a primarily faithful discourse, functioning as a 
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Conceived as such, a populist discourse must perceive itself as having involved into an 
activity that is not merely a repetitive play pursued just to keep things going, but a serious 
business capable of producing real change, for better or worse.   
However, what if there is a particular discourse out there whose populist credentials are 
‘shown in a particularly clear way’, but it nonetheless considers itself involved in a play, a 
not-so-serious activity that is ultimately inconsequential and pursued just for the sake of 
enjoyment received during the course of the act? A predominantly sceptical yet still populist 
discourse, which neither subverts the existing order nor attempts to radically reconstruct a new 
one, but simply plays it?  
This is precisely what Fieschi and Heywood coin as the ‘entrepreneurial populism’ (2004). 
They claim that populism of this sort, with its strategy focused exclusively on playing the 
existing system by exploiting its weakened functioning, does not fit into the traditional 
depiction of populism as anti-system, for it does not attempt to challenge the system at all. 
Neither does it defend it. Fieschi and Heywood consider Berlusconi and his Forza Italia as the 
foremost representative of this sort of populism. They argue that his popular appeal stems 
from having ‘done well by the system’ and being seen as ready to apply his ‘street-smarts’ to 
what is perceived as a system so deeply corrupted that it is considered ‘beyond rehabilitation’ 
(Fieschi and Heywood 2004, 299-302). The reasoning behind such support is: ‘although the 
system may be corrupt, the appropriate response is to vote for someone who can play this 
system to the mutual advantage of voter and candidate since he has proven his worth by 
prospering within it’ (2004, 303). Openly embracing the sceptical view that politics does not 
and cannot bring about any substantial change, an entrepreneurial populist proposes to put his 
immoral credentials into use in order to abuse the status quo. As Fieschi and Heywood assert, 
what this sceptical discourse receives, in turn, is essentially a cynical support insofar as, 
although their clientele do not trust the entrepreneurial populists nor the political system, they 
act as if they did because ‘there is something to be gained from that engagement—even if that 
gain is a perverse by-product’ of the system’s irreparable corruptness (2004, 293). 
In fact, Laclau seems to be well aware of this entrepreneurial populist phenomenon, as it is 
apparent in his discussion of Adhemar de Barros, a corrupt Brazilian politician from 1950s, 
who had the campaign motto “he steals, but he keeps things going” and sought support by 
offering political favours in exchange of votes (2005a, 122). According to Laclau, what 
accounts for the presence of populism in this case is Barros’s challenge to ‘business as usual’, 
like the figure of ‘bandit’ inspiring awe and attraction simply because he is ‘outside the legal 
system’ and defies it. Insofar as there are ‘raw anti-status-quo feelings’ present in any society, 
Laclau maintains that one should ‘intuitively perceive’ figures like Barros as populistic 
regardless of the ‘reasons’ for their challenge and ‘forms’ in which they articulate those anti-
status-quo feelings (2005a, 123). 
The problem here seems to be twofold. First, it is not immediately clear in what sense 
Barros’s clientelist strategy of political bribery constitutes a challenge to a deeply tarnished 
system, like in early 1950s Brazil, where political corruption was exceedingly present to the 
point of being the norm rather than the exception (Whitehead 2002; Skidmore 2007). His 
position seems to liken more of an “honest crook”, so to speak, who proposes to put his 
immoral credentials into use in order to abuse an irreparably broken system currently 
managed by other, equally immoral yet dishonest crooks. Also, even if one accepts he poses a 
challenge to the system, the idea of attributing the populist dimension of a discourse 
exclusively to its anti-status-quo disposition and, thus, equalizing populism with banditry 
brings about the familiar risk of entirely losing its conceptual particularity (Stavrakakis 2004). 
                                                                                                                                       
corrective whenever politics in a given society swings particularly close to its sceptical extreme (Canovan 1999). 
See also Arditi (2007, 44-53). 
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For then populism would be indistinguishable from practically any sort of rebellious 
discourse, be it obscure vigilantism or fundamentalist terrorism. 
 
3. Conclusion 
It is only in terms of their politico-ideological reputations and scholarly traditions they 
have given birth to, one may agree with Isaacs’ conclusion that an ocean lies between Laclau 
and Oakeshott. When it comes to their theory of the political, however, a completely different 
picture emerges. Both thinkers conceptualize the social as an inherently contingent system of 
meaning whose institution always leaves some residue outside. It is this ‘excess of meaning’, 
what Oakeshott calls ‘intimations’ that are present but do not fully appear in social 
arrangements, which constitutes the ground for the political reactivation. Therefore, what 
Marchant puts forward regarding Laclauian theory holds true also for Oakeshott: the social 
and the political are ‘two sides of the same coin’. The social is the political, only in a ‘sleeping 
mode’ where the political nature of its instituting moment is forgotten but can be reactivated 
at any time, turning what is considered as mundane practices of a social order into political 
manifestations (Marchant 2007, 147-8). Politics, on the other hand, consists of the set of 
practices and institutions through which this order is established as a result of discursive 
struggles between competing discourses. Both Laclau and Oakeshott consider it as constantly 
swinging on a continuum between two opposing yet impossible discourses whose presence 
and tension is nevertheless constitutive of politics: institutional/sceptical and populist/faithful 
ones. 
This profound similarity between Laclau and Oakeshott brings us to the crux of our 
conclusion, which largely supports Marchant’s reservations against what he calls the 
‘emancipatory apriorism’ prevalent within the post-foundational framework of left 
Heideggerianism (2007, 156-9). Utilizing, however briefly, the example of Oakeshott, he 
shows that it is equally possible to picture a politics based on post-foundationalism which is 
not necessarily radical or emancipatory but rather sceptical and conservative. It would be self-
contradictory to presuppose a particular ontic politics corresponding to post-foundationalist 
ontology: ‘to elaborate an explicitly leftist version of post-foundational thought is in itself a 
political decision’ (Marchart 2007, 3-4). Such an ‘emancipatory apriorism’ seems to be most 
apparent in Laclau’s assimilation of populism with politics tout court, assigning it an apriori 
tendency to ‘subvert the status quo’ and ‘radically reconstruct’ a new one. But as the case of 
entrepreneurial populism exhibits, it is just as possible to come up with a populist discourse 
which does not necessarily subvert the status quo nor aims to radically reconstruct a new one, 
but simply plays it. 
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